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Partial state capture by a single oligarchic 
group: The Gorilla Case in Slovakia 
ANDREJ ŠKOLKAY1 
 
Abstract: The article discusses the Gorilla case, an officially still-contested partial state capture by 
a single local oligarchic group, in line with the (partial) Elite Cartels corruption pattern in Slovakia. 
Due to the manner in which evidence, although considered unofficial, was made available, this case 
illustrates secret political and business processes during partial state capture. The initial absence of the 
case in public, political, and academic discourses, suggests that state capture can be present and operate 
undetected for a long time. This study also shows that in-depth analysis of the Gorilla case was avoided 
by both domestic and international political scientists, despite its paramount practical and theoretical 
importance. This, in turn, reflects a methodological capture of political science. Consequently, this article 
disentangles the complexities of the Gorilla case and lays down the foundation for further studies. 
Specifically, it highlights the need for more careful research, terminological precision in both theory-
building and empirical findings on state and media capture based on case studies, as well as re-
assessment of the methodology of political sciences used in these research areas. 
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1. Introduction 
The Gorilla case2, an alleged grand corruption case, had its importance 
downplayed by state authorities and the media (the latter in part being unaware of 
it), until public demonstrations flooded the streets of the capital of Slovakia a few 
years later. The anonymous publishing of files code-named Gorila, the Slovak 
version of the word Gorilla3, caused a major political scandal and subsequent 
public protests which led to dire consequences for the key governmental political 
                                                 
1 Senior researcher, Škola komunikácie a médií, n. o., Handlovská 45, 851 01 Bratislava, Slovakia. 
E-mail: askolkay@hotmail.com 
2 Slovenská Gorila: kompletní spis dokumentu (Slovak Gorilla: A Full File), 2012, January 9, 
https://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/monitor/Slovenska-Gorila-kompletni-spis-dokumentu-221331 
3 This codename is not related to the expression “800-pound gorilla” (US English metaphor for 
a person or organization so powerful that it can act without regard to the rights of others or the 
law), although it could actually nicely fit in this case. The nickname Gorilla was allegedly in 
reference to the robust body of a key actor in this case.  
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party, Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS). 
This was timely for critics and opponents of the party, who were concerned about 
its alleged reliance on dubious party financing – it had been facing significant 
long-term media criticism. The scandal also created a negative image for several 
key governing right-wing and centrist political parties as well as Smer-SD 
(Direction-Social Democracy), the key left-wing political party in Slovakia, shortly 
before early parliamentary elections in March 2012. The previous governments of 
Vladimír Mečiar leaned toward a proto-oligarchic regime. The celebrated end of 
his last government in 1998, however, did not end the associated collusion of 
politicians and businessmen. A nucleus oligarchic system was still secretly 
garnering support from the main political parties even after the regime’s 
replacement (see, e.g., Šátek 2010, 2012a). 
It was no suprise that leakage of the files via the Internet, and the resultant 
exposé of the widespread top-level corruption, shook politics in Slovakia. 
Obviously, this revelation resulted in heightened interest in the media in the 
scandal. This attention was in contrast to the previous disinterest and 
prolonged disregard for the case by those who knew about the files – the 
media, and other entities implicated from conservative estimates, including 
selected unauthorised individuals and private institutions around the year  2009.4 
Albeit it was, and is still officially, considered an assumption by the state 
authorities, the Gorilla scandal has gained notoriety as the most discussed 
corruption case in the history of the country. The database of SlovakiaOnline, 
a media content storage company, includes 5,400 mentions of “Gorilla” 
(+ “SIS”5 or “case” or “corruption”) between December 2011 and July 2014. 
This is more than three times as many mentions compared to Notice Board 
Tender, the second most-discussed corruption case with about 1,300 mentions 
in a much longer period.The Gorilla case demonstrates the dynamics of the 
covering-up, by politicians and key state authorities, of grand corruption under 
partial state capture, and the subsequent challenges of uncovering and reporting  
by the media (the latter discussed separately). The discrepancy between the 
extent of discussion and the involvement of the media, political scientists and 
other important stakeholders, provokes arguments which must be assessed 
from neutral and objective viewpoints. This study also briefly reviews the 
                                                 
4 See no author, 2015, May 21, Prečítajte si list bývalého agenta, ktorý nahrával Gorilu (Read a letter 
by former agent who wiretapped Gorilla), www.tvnoviny.sk/domace/1793994_precitajte-si-list-
byvaleho-agenta-ktory-nahraval-gorilu, A. Hanúsková, 2012, Gorila na roztrhanie. Dzurinda konečne 
prehovoril... (Gorilla as top agenda. Dzurinda finally spoke out), http://www.noviny.sk/c/ 
slovensko/gorila-na-roztrhanie-dzurinda-k-nej-vraj-barlicky-nepotrebuje-; 2012, February 1, Policajt 
z Gorily: Dzurinda ovplyvňoval vyšetrovanie korupcie! (Policeman from Gorilla: Dzurinda put 
pressure on investigating corruption!), www.topky.sk/ cl/1000120/1297902/Policajt-z-Gorily--
Dzurinda-ovplyvnoval-vysetrovanie-korupcie 
5 The Slovak Intelligence Service. The official title in English is Slovak Information Service. 
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regional situation with regard to state capture and theories of state capture, and 
suggests that the Gorilla case represents a partial state capture by a single local 
oligarchic group (in contrast to theories which discuss “cartels” and usually 
implicitly work with “full” state capture). 
Several academic publications have dealt with corruption generally (Mungiu-
Pippidi 2013, 2014), regionally (Baboš 2015; Kupka and Mochťak 2014; Charron, 
Lapuente and Rothstein 2013; Grigorescu 2006) and locally, with focus on 
Slovakia (e.g. Baboš and Malová 2014, Beblavý and Sičáková-Beblavá 2014). 
However, there remains a vacuum to be filled, until academically relevant, political 
science publications on the Gorilla case are made. Slovak authors, Staroňová and 
Malíková (2007), discussed corruption in Slovakia from a political science 
perspective. However, they mainly tackled grand corruption from the viewpoints 
of personal patronage, clientelism, and provision of hidden expertise to state 
authorities by vested interests and regulatory capture – all with limited, if any, 
local examples. The non-transparent financing of a major Slovak political party, 
which could indicate the presence of state capture in Slovakia, was mentioned 
only in a footnote in their study. However, the media reports on non-transparent 
financing of SDKÚ-DS and other political parties were widely discussed and 
investigated by the police at the time.6 Furthermore, the academic study by 
Staroňová and Malíková was conducted within the period which commenced 
when intelligence services tapped corruption practices related to a partial state 
capture in 2005/2006, and ended when the recordings were made public in 2011. 
Thus it can be inferred that these political scientists had a distorted analytical 
focus, because key information was not available to them, although it existed with 
state authorities and selected top politicians.  
Additionally, this study sought inspiration with other resources on the topic. 
The only specific full-length contribution available, which was conducted by 
Svoráková (2012), had methodological drawbacks. It gave a relatively unstructured 
description of the scandal, and a partial description of media coverage of the 
scandal based on a collection of only about 10 newspaper articles, blog 
contributions and wire agency reports. Notwithstanding, some observations by 
Svoráková appear to be correct. There is also a study by Deák (2013a, 2013b) 
which discussed both verdicts of the courts which initially banned, and 
subsequently allowed the publication of a novel based on the Gorilla transcripts. 
Having accessed both reliable and less than reliable sources, the present study 
emphasizes arguments in favour of understanding Gorilla as a case of partial 
capture, and highlights surprising analytical ignorance toward the scandal on the 
part of political scientists. For example, Svoráková’s study ultimately cannot be 
                                                 
6 See M. Pisárová (2004, April 1), SDKÚ faces funding scandal, http://spectator.sme.sk/c/ 
20022040/sdku-faces-funding-scandal.html 
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seen as a serious analytical or descriptive academic case-study contribution to the 
discussion on the topic, and thus supports the claim about scholarly ignorance. 
Attempts made by two journalistic-style books, the first written by one of the 
two key persons who tried to make this scandal public, Tom Nicholson (2012), and 
the second by controversial natural scientist and popular novelist, Gustáv Murín 
(2012), also fall short of filling this vacuum. Nicholson’s book is based on 
transcripts from wiretapping, which he had access to before they were made public. 
The second book is even less serious, although it covers famous local criminals.  
The role of oligarchs in Slovakia has also not been adequately documented, 
except for two books written by non-academics. The first one, written by 
a political insider Milan Krajniak (2015), is based on personal memories and 
journalistic style analyses, without providing any sources.7 Even though Krajniak 
tackles the case considerably, his insider view is relatively compromised due to his 
own role in the scandal. The other book, written by an investigative journalist 
Marek Vagovič (2016), is an edited collection of his previously published 
investigative articles. In spite of concerns regarding their quality, these books 
provide a foundation for more publications, and should not be ignored. Another 
worthy mention, a later journalistic study by Obradovič and Petková (2014), 
which demonstrates some limited share of oligarchs in the national economy, and 
provides an interesting journalistic overview – based on statistical data – of the 
possible impact of major oligarchic groups on Slovak economy. 
 
2. Methodology: Case Study and Discipline Capture 
From a broader perspective, the present paper investigates what the change in 
political and media importance of the Gorilla case (the latter discussed in detail in 
a separate paper) reveals about grand corruption under partial state capture. Even 
though the Gorilla case is of theoretical, political and academic importance, both 
Slovak and international political scientists exhibited marked indifference towards 
studying this case. Our study therefore critically analyses the dynamics of the 
political science framework which nurtured the persistence of this ignorance.  
 The lack of official evidence about grand corruption represents one possible 
explanation on why the case was ignored by political analysts, and partially explains 
why it did not initially receive the nation-wide coverage and importance despite its 
degree of scandalousness. Yet, our research questions the reliability of results from 
the official investigations of state authorities, under partial or full state capture. 
Consequently, the (partial) capture of the media, partial or full (depending on 
definition and available evidence) state capture, as well as the methodological 
capture of political sciences represent a better ground for a sound conclusion on 
                                                 
7 On this case, see for example J. Boyd, 2012, June 1, Former MP Charged with Corruption in 
“Notice Board” Tender, The Daily Slovakia www.thedaily.sk/former-mp-charged-with-
corruption-in-notice-board-tender/#ixzz48WWUlAPj 
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why all the major stakeholders ignored the case. This means, in other words, that 
wide public attention to the case as well as in-depth academic research in spite of 
missing official evidence, might have led to substantial impact on political life 
and/or relevant findings on state capture in a country. This is why an analysis of the 
possible (broadly understood, partial or full) capture of the stakeholders – 
politicians, state authorities, media and political scientists – is essential. 
This paper is meant to facilitate further debate and provide specific analytical 
insights, and thus deals primarily with the possible capture of the political 
sciences; the case of capture of the media and other key stakeholders will be dealt 
with in a separate article (or by other authors). The capture of the political 
sciences is defined as the lack of interest in research and in-depth documentation 
of specific case studies, or the ignorance of available indicators due to the lack of 
officially confirmed and truthful evidence, which is supposed to have been 
produced by captured state authorities. According to Box-Steffensmeier, Brady 
and Collier in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology (2009), political science 
methodology emphasizes three issues: utility for understanding politics, pluralism 
of approaches, and cutting across boundaries. The present case study, if deepened 
and extended, could be useful for understanding contemporary politics and 
drawing comparative lessons – especially as regards some of the core issues such 
as the role of the media, corruption. The requisite methodology and findings 
made could also prove relevant for other scientific disciplines – in other words, it 
would cut across disciplinary boundaries. Accordingly, it is surprising that a detailed 
examination of this case of grand corruption and state capture has been mostly 
ignored by political scientists – unless the analytical function of political science is 
only possible when researchers have access to data already verified by the state 
authorities themselves, which would however be an absurd situation. The lack of 
relevant studies raises a number of research questions. It is impossible to tackle all 
of them here; nevertheless, the sheer number of these questions suggests the 
failure of political science. Therefore, priority is given to introducing these 
potential research questions within context of an intrinsic or explanatory-evaluative 
case study. It should be noted that case studies are both theoretically and 
methodologically diverse and relatively subjective. According to Remler and van 
Ryzin (2015), the case-study approach adopted in this paper qualifies as a typical 
critical case. This type of case study emphasizes characteristics which have 
theoretical or practical significance. From Stake’s (2005) perspective, the paper 
can be considered an intrinsic case study, which is characterised by a holistic 
approach to a single case. In Yin’s categories (2013), this study’s approach 
qualifies as an exploratory-evaluative case study attempting at an exploratory, in-
depth analysis, and at describing the underlying complex interactions of the 
processes which governed the Gorilla case. It is also possible for types of case 
studies to overlap each other. The methodology of this work can thus best 
described as an intrinsic, critical, exploratory-evaluative case study.  
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There is also disagreement in literature on the use of theory in case studies. 
Stake (2005) argues that theory can be absent from case studies which focus on 
describing the case and its issues. Yin (2013) claims that theory can be used to 
guide the case study in an exploratory way. Creswell (1994) asserts that theory is 
employed toward the end of the study providing a “theory-after” perspective in 
which other theories are compared and contrasted with the theory developed in 
the case study. The current case study employs, to the extent that they are 
applicable, the theory of cartels, as well as the concepts of “oligarch” and “state 
capture” which together suggest a grand corruption scenario.  
By the means of a case study, this paper raises a number of challenging 
research questions and reveals possible analytical lessons to be learnt about the 
widely discussed yet under-analysed case of alleged grand corruption and state 
capture in Slovakia. Since the key salient issue is why this case was ignored by all 
major stakeholders in general, and political scientists in particular, some general 
introduction into the importance of the case is necessary. However, we will initially 
present three important relevant methodological sub-questions. These sub-
questions highlight and justify the analytical importance of the case, without the 
need to dig deeper into the details. (1) The first sub-question is related to the initial 
assessment on whether there was a state capture and what type of state capture we 
found. (2) Second, and more importantly, we discuss how one can analyse state 
capture under these unique circumstances. (3) The third sub-question investigates 
(and questions) the analytical relevance of the theory of cartels, as the only available 
relevant theory for such examination, in relation to state capture and grand 
corruption.  
(1) The first methodological sub-question is concerned with the extent to 
which one can assume that there was a state capture, and which type of state 
capture occurred if the answer to the former is in the affirmative. The text indeed 
answers the question in the affirmative by arguing that a partial state capture – 
which is not a commonly used term in related theory of state capture – occurred. 
It is true that World Bank experts (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2003) as well as 
other experts (including Philp 2001; Fazekas and Tóth 2014) attempted previously 
to distinguish different levels and methods of state capture. Nevertheless, the 
majority of recent studies in political science (including Keil 2018; Innes 2014) 
approach state capture from a broad perspective. It is also true that partial state 
capture is a common situation; for example, it is currently widely discussed in 
many post-communist countries and South Africa. 
(2) Consequently, as regards the second sub-question, this case is approached 
in a manner which will provide palpable evidence, although mostly indirect and 
unofficial, on how partial state capture has operated before. The study also 
assesses the complex interactions between key players or captors, that is, 
politicians, state authorities, and investigative bodies. It hypothesises, and tries to 
support the claim, that there can be a successful cover-up of grand corruption, by 
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means of partial state capture. In other words, captors may have direct or indirect 
control over state authorities who are supposed to investigate the state capture. 
Consequently, the study explores the possible exploits of captors, and the 
corollaries thereof, using a common reference scenario: When evidence is 
revealed publicly, official investigation may take years, and involved actors may 
successfully use legal means to prevent the use of crucial evidence. The study 
presents an independent analysis of the case, on the premise that academic 
jurisdictions are not limited by legal restrictions on the use of evidence. In lieu of 
the possible risk that independent analyses can turn out to be incorrect, especially 
due to the complexity of cases like the Gorilla and a lack of officially recognised 
evidence, the conclusions presented in this paper are reached by examining 
a wealth of evidence from (non-academic) sources. The selection of these sources 
was determined content-wise; the qualifying criteria concerned the relevance and 
logic of arguments used by the key actors; actions performed by state authorities – 
or their revealing indifference prior to the case going public, or after that, as well 
as contradictions in their statements or follow-up steps –; silence of politicians on 
the issue before making the scandal public or inconsistent answers afterwards. 
These make the bulk of analytical evidence used for situating the case in the 
relevant intrinsic, critical, exploratory-evaluative case study framework.  
The use of written evidence – summary of transcripts about high-level 
corruption talks –, although not legally valid, has been justified by the statements 
by the former head of the special police investigations unit, who confirmed that 
the operations described were mostly verified during investigation. The use of 
anecdotal evidence, such as personal public testimonies, was also justified by 
reliability indicators of persons interviewed: the former head of the special police 
investigations team and a former counterintelligence agent.  
(3) The third methodological sub-question concerns the relevance of the 
theory of cartels in relation to state capture and grand corruption. The study 
presents the argument that there was a single “cartel” which was documented in 
the Gorilla case, and accordingly attempts to support the claim that it was a partial 
Elite Cartel pattern of grand corruption. This is approached from a perspective 
which creates a contrasting scenario of a full state capture by Elite Cartels. 
Furthermore, we briefly discuss the problematic use of the term “cartel”. 
 
3. The Development of the Gorilla case 
In order to make up for the lack of relevant academic literature on the Gorilla case, 
we now present an overview of its development. Due to space limitations, we 
cannot provide a full discussion; therefore only the major points of the case are 
covered. The story is known to local experts and is frequently (although briefly) 
mentioned in political and media discourses. However, explanations may differ and 
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the memories of the key events, persons, actors and proper chronology, die away or 
become blurred with time.  
What has become known as “the Gorilla case” had its origin in the late 
months of the year 2005 and early months of the following year. Since then, the 
case has been ongoing for over a decade. However, it became publicly known 
only six years after its origin, even though evidence exists which shows that some 
state authorities were aware of it already in 2005 and 2006. The aforementioned 
lengthy Gorilla document emerged shortly before Christmas in 2011 on an 
international website, with summaries of fake or real (depending on the 
perspective of a reader) transcripts of private conversations between some top 
and lower-level public and private figures.8 Obviously, intelligence services never 
officially confirmed the veracity of the leaked file. The published file was 
supposedly compiled by the Slovak Intelligence Agency (SIS). The fact that the 
SIS monitored a particular apartment during that particular period has been 
confirmed by the court which had initially permitted wiretapping, although 
another court later declared it illegal. 
The persons involved in the file discussed privatisation deals conducted or 
planned during the second term of the government led by Mikuláš Dzurinda, 
a reformist Prime Minister who held office between 1998 and 2006.9 The 
allegations that bribes worth millions of Euros were paid or promised to public or 
party officials, politicians and/or political parties to win various public 
procurement and privatisation contracts lie at the heart of this scandal. Several 
ministers of government, representatives of multinational organizations, all four 
political parties in Dzurinda’s second coalition government, and tycoons from 
Penta Investment Group – one of the largest Slovak private equity investment 
groups – were implicated as well. Moreover, illegal activities of other important 
politicians and political party nominees were mentioned during the conversations. 
These conversations were accidentally10 – though as mentioned above, upon initial 
court’s permission – recorded in 2005 and 2006 in an apartment. It is presumed 
that the first civil person to gain access to the file was Tom Nicholson, a British-
Canadian journalist naturalised in Slovakia. In 2009, he tried to contact the media 
and police with the information. However, editors of the newspaper Sme and 
business weekly Trend did not dare to publish this information on the assumption 
                                                 
8 Slovenská Gorila: kompletní spis dokumentu (Slovak Gorilla: A Full File), 2012, January 9, 
https://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/monitor/Slovenska-Gorila-kompletni-spis-dokumentu-221331 
9 He also was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Iveta Radičová’ s 2010–2012 government. 
10 The agent of SIS lived in the same block of flats in which meetings were held. He informed his 
superiors about suspicious visits of some high-ranking persons around, and the court gave initial 
permission to wiretapping; see Valček (2016), although Škubla (2016), concluded that the 
Constitutional Court banned any legal use of transcripts of recordings from the Gorilla case in its 
Statement III. ÚS 490/2015. Even earlier, the Constitutional Court had cancelled previous court’s 
permission allowing wiretapping operation and called it unconstitutional, on November 20, 2012. 
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that there was inadequate evidence, although the police had started to deal with 
the case in two independent investigations (Kostolný 2012a).11 The extent to 
which the material published online can be considered genuine, and a valid match 
to the official documentation of the SIS, remains debatable (Nôta 2015). Some 
analysts consider it authentic evidence – Svoráková (2012: 2) considers it partially 
authentic, while Šátek (2012a; 2012b) seems to consider it fully authentic. 
Paradoxically, Nicholson, the key mover behind the scandal, raised doubts about 
the introductory and concluding parts of the document (Hanus and Vagovič 
2012). However, there are only few doubts about the fact that the information 
described in the file reflects a true depiction of how politics and big businesses 
secretly interacted in Slovakia (see Šátek 2012a, 2012b; also interviews with 
M. Gajdoš, the [former] head of special police investigating team, in Vagovič 
2017; and Tódová 2017). 
Nicholson mentioned three reasons why he believed the Gorilla file was 
trustworthy. Firstly, every major issue included in the file subsequently happened 
the way it was mentioned, with just minor irrelevant variations. Secondly, every 
person from SIS with whom he spoke confirmed the relevance of the file; nobody 
said it was nonsense or unauthentic, except the people themselves involved in the 
corruption scandal (Nicholson 2012). Thirdly, the former Prime Minister Iveta 
Radičová took the last existing intelligence summary of the Gorilla case, deposited 
in the Government Office, and gave it to the state authorities responsible for 
investigation, even though she did so only after the scandal became public 
(Klačanská and Mezencová 2012). Again, the data anonymously published in the 
late part of 2015 suggested that some events described in the file were most likely 
based on facts.12 Furthermore, the sitting Prime Minister at the time, Robert Fico, 
stated with regard to Gorilla: “...if there would be successful investigation, we 
would learn facts about the second Dzurinda government that would cause goose 
bumps” (Pravda, November 19, 2016, p.2). At about the same time Marek Gajdoš, 
the head of the special investigation team, announced his resignation. The 
resignation is believed to have been partly caused by internal conflicts within the 
investigation hierarchy, especially when the supervising special prosecutor seemed 
to be holding up the investigation instead of helping it proceed. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
11 P. Bielik and B. Oprala (2016, April), Tom Nicholson: Vyčítali mi, že som blázon bojujúci proti 
systému (Tom Nicholson: They criticised me for being a fool fighting the system), 
http://gaudeo.sk/tom-nicholson/, see June 15, 2015, https://dennikn.sk/minuta/160519/; 2012, 
January 17, PROKURATÚRA: Preskúmali kauzu Gorila zákonným spôsobom a nestranne (The 
Office of the Prosecutor: They investigating the case Gorilla according to law and impartially), 
http://ipolitika.sk/2012/01/prokuratura-preskumali-kauzu-gorila-zakonnym-sposobom-a-
nestranne/ 
12 See the video from press conference by journalist Marek Vagovič and lawyer from an NGO 
Zuzana Čaputová, 5 November 2015, www.tyzden.sk/video/27851/potvrdili-pravost-casti-spisu-
gorila/; also Daniš (2015); but see also the counter-arguments by Penta in Ďurík (2015). 
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Gajdoš once again confirmed that the majority of facts mentioned in the file had 
been verified as accurate during the investigation. Gajdoš explained that this type 
of corruption is difficult to investigate, which is why criminal consequences for 
perpetrators were unlikely in the few years following the events – according to 
Gajdoš, investigation had to start immediately, in order to achieve punitive effects 
(interviews with Gajdoš in Tódová 2017 and Vagovič 2017; see also Wágner 2017 
on the controversial role of supervising authorities). Another important issue is 
the leakage of the Gorilla file on the Internet. Without this anonymous publishing, 
there wouldn’t have been the nationwide scandal surrounding the case. It is still 
unknown how the classified information was leaked to the public and who initially 
published the Gorilla file on the Internet.  
The fact of media apathy during the period cannot be overstated. Some editors 
as well as top- and low-level politicians knew about the Gorilla case a few years 
before it was made public.13 However, media organizations avoided publishing or 
broadcasting excerpts from this file due to their fear of follow-up libel suits. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that some media outlets did not know about 
the file.14 In any case, no politician pushed for the investigation of the scandalous 
case before the case became publicly known. Some independent observers, 
politicians, politically appointed civil servants, and later also Gajdoš, claimed that 
the SIS itself had shown a lack of interest in cooperating toward the examination of 
the files and the case (Nicholson 2012; interview with Gajdoš in Tódová 2017). 
Others, including the former head of SIS, blamed the police or state prosecutors for 
a lack of true interest in investigating the case (see Mihočková, 2015). Perhaps both 
claims are correct. The scandal remained partly hidden for a long time, and other 
directors were appointed for the stakeholder institutions. Jozef Šátek (2012b), 
former director of Anti-corruption Authority, argued that the initial lack of interest 
in investigating the case could have occurred due to forthcoming parliamentary 
elections which were scheduled in 2010 (see also Čikovský 2017). The dubious role 
of Dobroslav Trnka, another state representative, was revealed when he personally 
raised serious doubts about the authenticity of the file and attempted to push for 
the Gorilla case to be investigated directly through the Prosecutor General’s Office, 
while acting as Deputy Prosecutor General. The Minister of Interior Daniel Lipšic 
finally established a special team to investigate the Gorilla case in January 2012, and 
                                                 
13 See No author, 2015, May 21, Prečítajte si list bývalého agenta, ktorý nahrával Gorilu (Read 
a letter by former agent who wiretapped Gorilla), www.tvnoviny.sk/domace/1793994_precitajte-
si-list-byvaleho-agenta-ktory-nahraval-gorilu; A. Hanúsková, 2012, Gorila na roztrhanie. Dzurinda 
konečne prehovoril... (Gorilla as top agenda. Dzurinda finally spoke out), 
www.noviny.sk/c/slovensko/gorila-na-roztrhanie-dzurinda-k-nej-vraj-barlicky-nepotrebuje-; 2012, 
February 1, Policajt z Gorily: Dzurinda ovplyvňoval vyšetrovanie korupcie! (Policeman from 
Gorilla: Dzurinda put pressure on investigating. www.topky.sk/cl/1000120/1297902/Policajt-z-
Gorily--Dzurinda-ovplyvnoval-vysetrovanie-korupcie- 
14 As stated above, media coverage and attitudes are dealt with in a separate paper. 
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several politicians called for a thorough examination of the claims contained in the 
file. 
As of the publication of this study, the slow (see Šátek 2012c) but extensive 
(see Vagovič, 2015)15 official investigation of the case by the state authorities is still 
ongoing, although Dušan Kováčik, the special prosecutor, claimed in May 2016 
that the investigation was about to be completed (Ducár 2016).  
There was a contrast between the public’s as well as media interest in learning 
more about the case, and attempts by the main private-commercial actor to 
downplay it. On the one hand, an eruption of media coverage occurred in relation 
to this case, along with politicians struggling to issue statements in an endeavour 
to withstand politically the scandal, protests and other forms of pressure from the 
discontented public. Public and media interest in this case was renewed after 
a new round of leaks, code-named by the media as “Gorilla II”, which occurred in 
late 2015 and concerned indirect high payments from Penta Investment Group to 
a company belonging to the former head of the counter-intelligence unit of SIS, 
(see e.g. Tódová 2015b).16 On the other hand, Penta Investment Group as the 
main private “antagonist” mentioned in the file exerted a lot of PR17 and legal 
counter-effort18 into tackling this issue. All this highlights the need for more 
detailed focus on the role of oligarchs in politics and the economy in general, 
either in Slovakia or other post-communist countries.  
 
4. Theoretical Ramifications: Slovakia as a Case of Partial State 
Capture by Oligarchs 
The Gorilla files present a good model for how local oligarchs subordinate politics 
and the economy to their own interests. In other words, this case deals with 
possible grand corruption19, partial state capture20 or partially appropriated state21. 
                                                 
15 The Special Prosecutor (who deals with organised crime and other forms of especially serious 
crime) Dušan Kováčik, claimed that the police file on investigation of Gorilla had 60,000 pages, 
police conducted 650 interviews, and asked 12times for legal help from abroad and initiated 
20 criminal proceedings as of June 2015. However, interview with the key witness – former SIS 
agent Holúbek, was done only in summer of 2016, but rather formally and without going into 
substantial issues, and under unusual conditions (see interview with Gajdoš in Vagovič, 2017, and 
interview with Holúbek, in Cuprík, 2016). 
16 For the original transcript see http://skgorila2.tumblr.com/ 
17 See www.kauzagorila.sk and www.pentaokauze.sk/ According to the intellinews, September 22, 
2014, Penta had 3,000 mentions at the height of the Gorilla scandal. Jaroslav Haščák claimed that 
the Gorilla case was a PR disaster but mostly in Slovakia, less so in the Czech Republic or Poland, 
and there was almost no impact of this scandal in Germany (in Haluza, 2013). 
18 See for example the letter by legal representatives of Penta sent to various websites, 
www.ginn.press/news/hascak-penta-utocia-na-gorilu or Valček (2015a) and Burčík, (2016). 
19 “Grand corruption” by political and business elites involves the payment of bribes to gain 
contracts but also the purchase of political influence. In contrast, “petty” corruption is when 
people are expected to pay bribes in order to get the service they are entitled to from a public 
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A discussion on the complex relationship between oligarchism and state capture is 
necessary. This is emphasized by the observation by Maniokas (2014) that the 
issues of corruption and state capture are no longer deviations; instead, they have 
become the norm. The modern oligarchic system is broadly considered as 
a concealed political and business regime based on corruption (Johnston 2005). 
The European Union Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative defines state capture as 
the phenomenon in which outside interests are able, through corrupt transactions 
with public officers and politicians, to bend state laws, policies and regulations to 
their benefit (Bell 2010: 1). Even though this is the most common definition, 
other definitions are worth considering. Calus (2015) defines state capture as 
a process of subordinating state institutions to the leaders of the political parties. 
Consequently, the argument is acceptable that in all such cases we may deal with 
grand corruption or state capture which is fuelled or nurtured by political and 
business elites in both democratic and non-democratic states, regardless of 
whether these states are rich or not (Porta and Vanucci 1999). Whatever 
definition is used, state capture is seen as the most destructive and intractable 
corruption problem, particularly in transitioning economies (Bell 2010: 1).22 
Johnston (2005) identified four syndromes or patterns of corruption 
(“Influence Markets,” “Elite Cartels,” “Oligarchs and Clans,” and “Official 
Moguls”) which correspond to four ways of combining politics and economics, as 
well as the quality of public economic and financial institutions. Of these four 
syndromes, the partial Elite Cartels system presumably operated at the time of 
incidence of the Gorilla case within Slovakia, and the entirety of developments 
behind the Gorilla scandal seem to confirm this hypothesis. The specification 
“partial” is used to emphasize the involvement of a single cartel, the Penta 
Investment Group – although “cartel” may not qualify as the best analytical term 
in this scenario. However, this does not preclude that there could be more cartels 
or, more appropriately, oligarchic groups which were operating in a similar way in 
                                                                                                                                 
employee. The Anti-Corruption Research Centre defines high level or grand corruption as corrupt 
acts that take place at the policy formulation level of the political system. It refers not so much to 
the amount of money involved as to the level at which it occurs – where policies and rules may be 
unjustly influenced. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Anti-Corruption Unit defines 
grand corruption as corrupt acts that often involve prominent persons in both the private and 
public sectors who exercise influence over large government contracts (Bell 2010: 1). 
20 The concept of state capture was introduced by Karklins (2002) and Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann (2003) to describe some aspects of economy transition in some of the former 
communist countries of Eastern Europe. In this transition, some companies were deliberately 
adopting strategies of networking to influence government officials and politicians to change the 
laws and regulations in their favour, and partly accomplished it through corrupt payments, 
although Karklins understood this concept more broadly (see more in Naxera 2015). 
21 See Figure 1: Typical network configurations of corruption and state capture in Fazekas and Tóth (2014). 
22 See more in Transparency International (2014): State capture: an overview, 
https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/State_capture_an_overview_2014.pdf 
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Slovakia at that time.23 Notwithstanding, a measure of state capture should be 
based on the extent to which the state’s decision making is distorted by the illicit 
influence of powerful firms, and not necessarily on the number of firms actively 
exerting such influence (World Bank 2000). A study by Steves and Rousso (2003: 
14) suggested that the state capture index of Slovakia was similar to the worst half 
of Central East European states in 1999 (i.e after the fall of Mečiar’s regime) and 
during the first year of Dzurinda’s first reformist government. 
 The “state capture index”, in the study by Steves and Rousso, refers to the 
unweighted average of countries’ scores on six components of state capture, 
including firms’ influence over the government, parliament, criminal and 
commercial courts, central bank, and political parties. According to this study, 
Slovakia’s state capture was less significant than that of Bulgaria, worse than that 
of Romania, and almost identical with those of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Ironically, Slovakia performed above average in almost all monitored anti-
corruption parameters: Intensity of Anti-Corruption Index, Omnibus Index, Legal 
Framework Index and Conventions Index. In the majority of these anti-
corruption activity indices from 1999–2002, shortly before the Gorilla case was 
wiretapped, Slovakia was among the top countries or best achievers (Steves and 
Rousso 2003: 9). In other words, prior to the Gorilla case Slovakia demonstrated 
commendable results on various anti-corruption measures. Nevertheless, this did 
not have any impact on the behind-the-scenes grand corruption and state capture 
events, as described in the Gorilla file. This is in itself an important and intricate 
finding. The measures may not depict the realities of corruption. Consequently, 
the assertion that this poor state of affairs probably persisted even after the 
Gorilla scandal could be valid. Innes (2014) argues that most new EU Member 
States, mostly post-communist states, experience serious problems of state 
capture. Innes suggests that states like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Latvia show high levels of “corporate state capture” in which public 
power is exercised primarily for private gain. Alwasiak et al (2014) found that in 
Poland, the majority of legal acts were passed with the aim to satisfy the interests 
of particular groups and this continually increased over the years. Nevertheless, 
the state capture through the oligarchic system in new EU Member States is not 
as developed as, for example, in neighbouring Ukraine, where the “oligarchs and 
clans” syndrome can be found (Matuszak 2012; Olszański 2017). However, there 
are cases of similar, more likely full, state capture syndromes among other South 
Eastern European states (see e.g. Keil 2018). 
                                                 
23 See e.g. the list of alleged local oligarchs in Konštantín Čikovský (2015, March 11), 10 
investigatívnych žurnalistov pomenovalo 5 najväčších oligarchov (10 investigative Journalists 
named five most important oligarchs), https://dennikn.sk/69130/10-investigativnych-zurnalistov-
pomenovalo-5-najvacsich-oligarchov/ 
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In consequence, examples of state capture can be identified as bribery, 
“ownership” of politicians, control of regulatory agencies – in this particular case, 
a privatisation agency called National Property Fund – which does not involve 
violence and intimidation originating from oligarchs (Philp, 2001). At least, this 
was true until Ján Kuciak, a data investigative journalist, was murdered in early 
2018. This is not an assertion that Kuciak was killed on order by oligarchs; 
instead, it points out that his journalistic investigation threatened somebody’s 
grand-size illegal profit-seeking activities. In other words, independent 
investigation was seen as a bigger threat than investigation which was sanctioned 
by state authorities. In that regard, this murder could be regarded as a turning 
point in the modern history of Slovakia. Again, Kuciak’s case deserves to be 
covered in a separate case study. It is also worthy of mention that Slovak 
journalists faced intimidation even before this murder, but violent threats did not 
originate from local oligarchs. Instead, local oligarchs used legal means to harass 
and intimidate them.  
It is likely that this form of partial state capture did not have a strong 
immediate impact on economic growth in Slovakia. According to Damijan and 
Damijan (2017), corruption is shown in some regions to affect growth through 
state capture activities, while in others it is shown to have a negative impact in the 
long-run rather than in the short term. It can be assumed that partial state capture 
did not last long enough, and did not involve major sectors of the economy, to 
have a strong effect on the Slovakian economy. The Slovak GDP grew between 
2001 and 2005 by about 4% annually (Okáli 2006: 6). However, another question 
arises pertaining to whether the GDP growth could be higher without state 
capture in the long-term. 
 
5. Conclusion 
After more than thirteen years of existence and seven years after its publication, 
the Gorilla case remains as an unresolved high-profile national political scandal 
(see Penta Investments 2016 or Burčík 2016). Unexpectedly, the media reported 
in December 2018 that the Police had found audio-recordings of SIS wire-tapping 
operation in the safe of a businessman seen as responsible for various alleged 
criminal activities including, possibly, the already mentioned murder of 
investigative journalist Kuciak. This could mean a turning point in the Gorilla 
case. This finding was not directly related to the investigation that was still 
ongoing during the writing of this study. Although the key police investigator 
publicly confirmed the authenticity of the events described in the file (interview 
with Gajdoš in Tódová 2017; Burčík, 2015; see also Čikovský 2012; and counter-
arguments by Penta24), no court verdicts have been passed so far.25 However, it 
                                                 
24 See Penta (no date): Transakcie v spise (Transactions in the file), www.pentaokauze.sk/sk/ 
articles.aspx?r=34mPCE 
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was a significant development that the police initiated four new criminal charges 
related to the Gorilla case in 2017.26 It appears that the file correctly described 
corrupt negotiations and deals between politicians and the oligarchic investment 
group, considering all the evidence and circumstances analysed.27 This is further 
supported by the sharp and systematic reactions, including both legal and PR 
efforts of the Penta Investment Group. For example, Penta issued a legal request 
demanding that the recordings found in the safe of jailed businessman in 
December 2018 be destroyed. Yet, Penta Investment Group could not know the 
precise content of these recordings. 
Thus, this preliminary, and probably final, assessment of veracity of Gorilla 
scandal is rather important – if the narratives from the file were all fabricated 
stories, the media could be seen as misleading the public. Consequently, the 
Gorilla case would become the biggest media hoax and fake scandal in the history 
of Slovakia. However, the eagerness which Penta Investment Group 
demonstrated toward the ban on the use of “fake” recordings, or recordings of 
unknown content cannot be simply overlooked. If we look for some positive 
upshot of the Gorilla case, we could say it ultimately provided a platform through 
which the public learnt in general terms about hidden business and political 
practices which amounted to a form of partial state capture by a single local 
“cartel”. Because a single oligarchic grouping was documented in the case, we 
have a reason to claim that Gorilla case indeed followed a partial Elite Cartels 
pattern of grand corruption, in contrast to the scenario when a full state capture 
by Elite Cartels emerges. This conclusion does not preclude the possibility of such 
a development in Slovakia, for which the present study has not found sufficient 
evidence. We have also corroborated the conjecture that the local judiciary, police, 
and especially state prosecutors may not be reliable sources of information on the 
real state of affairs, especially in cases of grand corruption under (partial) state 
capture and/or (partial) media capture. Police investigators may start 
investigations too late, without the needed support and serious commitment from 
supervisory and other key authorities. Similarly, the judiciary may be limited in 
                                                                                                                                 
25 See related criminal charges to one of privatisation deals, Kauza Slovenských elektrární: Polícia 
vzniesla nové obvinenie (The Cause of Slovak Power Plant: Police has raised new charges), at 
www.maplefish.sk/kauza-slovenskych-elektrarni-policia-vzniesla-nove-obvinenie/, March 12, 
2016. The very first criminal charges directly related to Gorilla were raised but also immediately 
cancelled in 2012, see Prokurátor zastavil trestné stíhanie Pavla Ruska (Prosecutor Stopped 
Criminal Investigation of Pavol Rusko), (March 15, 2012), www.noviny.sk/c/slovensko/ 
prokurator-udajne-zastavil-trestne-stihanie-pavla-ruska 
26 http://www.tvnoviny.sk/domace/1876670_styri-nove-stihania-v-kauze-gorila, July 1, 2017 
27 See for example, Malchárek z Gorily dostal po odchode z politiky milióny. Od podozrivej firmy 
s cyperskými vlastníkmi (Malchárek from Gorilla obtained millions after he left politics. He got 
this money from a  suspicious company with Cypriot owners), December 10, 2015, 
www.aktuality.sk/clanok/309885/malcharek-z-gorily-mal-po-odchode-z-politiky-dostat-miliony-
od-podozrivej-firmy-s-cyperskymi-vlastnikmi/ 
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their search for justice by means of procedural rules. The processes which are 
utilised to validate evidence can easily become bureaucratic and unable to achieve 
the desired goals.  
The Gorilla case, in a manner similar to numerous information-leak cases 
worldwide, demonstrates that the modern digital environment makes it rather 
difficult for corrupt networks to maintain deep secrecy. On the other hand, these 
corrupt networks may prevent, postpone, and complicate investigations of some 
of these cases. They are capable of meddling with the legal framework to such an 
extent that the cases became obscure and impossible t resolve, all the while the 
pieces of evidence are becoming marked as legally irrelevant by courts, or even 
disappear altogether. The influence of some state representatives and their 
willingness to protect their vested interests provide favourable circumstances for 
such phenomena to occur. Their links to the government further complicates the 
proceedings, because any discrepancies may be blamed on governments and 
relevant authorities, instead of the blameworthy individuals.  
This study identified a triple paradox within the Gorilla case. Firstly, the 
unofficial watch-dog which is the media did not initially want to deal with the 
case, or was uninformed about the file. The reasons for this lack of coverage 
and specifics of the media environment at that time will be discussed in 
a separate article. Secondly, from the point of the liberal democratic ideal of 
checks and balances, it was disconcerting to realize that official state authorities 
attempted to downplay this case as well, absurdly blaming each other for the 
initial failure of investigation and lack of mutual co-operation. Thirdly, neither 
domestic nor international political scientists engaged in an in-depth study of 
the Gorilla file as well as analysis of the resulting political and social events. 
Domestic journalists and non-fiction writers had to take the mantle and 
supplement their work. We suspect that the absence of timely and reliable 
analyses of such important if legally unresolved phenomena, which often result 
from the analysts’ heavy reliance on media and political discourse, and 
subsequent sub-optimal analytical focus on the part of political scientists, might 
contribute to recurrence of such developments in the future. 
The study demonstrates that cases of grand corruption provide opportunities 
for research into the complex dynamics which govern the corrupt relationship 
between business and politics, and how these can negatively impact the 
stakeholders who have been entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing the 
integrity of public authorities and the management of national resources. There is 
much left to be covered on the related conceptual, terminological and 
methodological aspects of such cases. There is also a vacuum to be filled 
regarding research on the roles of various stakeholders involved in grand 
corruption cases. 
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